Kastner's (2003) latest objections to the counterfactual usage of the time-symmetric Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule by Mohrhoff, especially her claims that the resulting time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals (TSQCs) are (i) vacuous and (ii) invalid, are examined and shown to be unfounded and/or ill-conceived and/or beside the point. Mohrhoff's TSQCs must be assessed in the context of his "Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics" (including his views on the temporality of the physical world) and of the specific question they serve to address: how can we describe a quantum system between measurements? That interpretation and this question are the subjects of two preliminary sections.
Introduction
has raised fresh objections to Mohrhoff's (2000) counterfactual usage of the time-symmetric ABL rule (Aharonov et al. 1964) , adding to objections she raised in her (2001) , most of which were met by Mohrhoff in his (2001) . Here we show that these fresh objections, including those not adequately dealt with in Mohrhoff's (2001) , are unfounded and/or ill-conceived and/or beside the point. Section 2 stakes out the context in which time-symmetric quantum counterfactuals (TSQCs) are used by Mohrhoff, in particular his "Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics" (PIQM) and his views on the temporality of the physical world. Section 3 introduces the specific question that is addressed by his TSQCs: how can we describe a quantum system between measurements? These are important preliminaries to the fourth section, in which Kastner's objections are examined.
The context
We are accustomed to the idea that the redness of a ripe tomato exists in our minds, rather than in the physical world-the world described by physical theory. We find it rather more difficult to accept that the same is true of the experiential now: it has no counterpart in the physical world. There simply is no objective way to characterize the present. The temporal modes past, present, and future can be characterized only by how they relate to us as conscious subjects: through memory, through the present-tense immediacy of sensory qualities, or through anticipation. In the physical world, we may qualify events or states of affairs as past, present, or future relative to other events or states of affairs, but we cannot speak of the past, the present, or the future. The proper view of physical reality is not only what Nagel (1986) has called "the view from nowhere"-the physical world does not contain a preferred position corresponding to the spatial location whence I survey it-but also what Price (1996) has called "the view from nowhen": the physical world does not contain a preferred time corresponding to the particular moment (the present) at which I experience it. The idea that some things exist not yet and others exist no longer is as true (phenomenologically speaking) and as false (physically speaking) as the idea that a ripe tomato is red. This is not a new insight. Augustine (1994) suggested long ago that time may be a dimension of the soul, rather than of the outer world. In a letter of condolence to the sister and the son of his lifelong friend Michele Besso, Einstein wrote (Einstein and Besso 1979) : "For us believing physicists, the distinction between past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion." The fact that this distinction cannot be grasped by science, was to Einstein a matter of painful but inevitable resignation (Carnap 1963) . More recently the point was reiterated by Hans Primas and by Stephen Priest:
All really fundamental physical dynamical laws are invariant under time translation and time reversal. Moreover, the concept of the "now"-the brief interval that divides the past from the future-is absent in all fundamental mathematical formulations, both in classical physics and in quantum physics. That is, in a context-independent ontic description there is no physical basis for the the distinction between past and future. (Primas 2003, original emphases)
The tripartite temporal taxonomy has no physicalist or scientific or empirical explanation (never has, never will). Any explanation that is not empirical or scientific is metaphysical or theological so if the existence of past, present, and future can be explained, it can only be explained metaphysically or theologically. (Priest 2006) As Primas points out, the fundamental physical laws are time-symmetric. They permit us to retrodict as well as to predict. Because the classical dynamical laws correlate events deterministically, they admit of causal interpretations. Or so it seems, for there is no physical basis for the associated causal arrow. It is we who project it into the physical world, based on our subjective and perhaps illusory sense of agency, which is made possible by a subjective temporal asymmetry: our ability to know the past as against our inability to know the future.
If, in addition, we project into the physical world the singular phenomenological presence of the present, we come to conceive of an evolving instantaneous state-a threedimensional "front" advancing through four-dimensional spacetime.
1 And if, in order to save a genuine (as against compatibilist) free will from the fatalism allegedly implied by the "block universe" of special relativity, 2 we embrace presentism, we arrive at the wellknown folk tale according to which causal influences reach from the past to the future through persistent "imprints" on the present. A no-longer-existing past can influence a 1 This conception is flawed. If we imagine a spatiotemporal whole as a simultaneous spatial whole, then we cannot imagine this simultaneous spatial whole as persisting and the present as advancing through it. There is only one time, the fourth dimension of the spatiotemporal whole. There is not another time in which this spatiotemporal whole persists as a spatial whole and in which the present advances. If the experiential now is anywhere in the spatiotemporal whole, it is trivially and vacuously everywhere-or, rather, everywhen.
2 Stapp (2001) , among others, has argued that the coexistence of the spatiotemporal whole implied by special relativity in turn implies that the future is as "fixed and settled" as the past. The coexistence of the spatiotemporal whole, however, is not simultaneous but tenseless and/or atemporal. It is a feature of the view from nowhen (Price 1996) . In this view time does not "pass" or "flow", nor is there anything corresponding to the difference between the past and the future. An already existing future would indeed by difficult to reconcile with the possibility of freely choosing a future course of action. But since an "already existing future" is a contradiction in terms, the only way to prevent the future from being determined by choices that are freely made now, is the possibility of foreknowledge, and of this there is little if any evidence.
not-yet-existing future only through the mediation of something that persists. Causal influences reach from the past into the future by being "carried through time" by something that "stays in the present." This evolving instantaneous state includes not only all presently possessed properties but also traces of everything in the past that is causally relevant to the future.
In classical physics, this is how we come to conceive of "fields of force" that evolve in time (and therefore, in a relativistic world, according to the principle of local action), and that mediate between the past and the future. The calculation of classical electromagnetic effects, for instance, can be carried out in two steps: given the distribution and motion of charges, we calculate a set of functions of position and time known as the "electromagnetic field", and using these functions, we calculate the electromagnetic effects that these charges have on another charge. The rest is embroidery, 3 viz., that the electromagnetic field is a physical entity in its own right, that it is locally generated by charges, that it mediates the action of charges on charges by locally acting on itself, and that it locally acts on charges.
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In quantum physics, this is why we tend to seize on algorithms that depend on the times of measurements (to the possible outcomes of which they serve to assign probabilities), to misconstrue the time dependence of such an algorithm as that of an evolving physical state, and to conceive of this state as mediating the dependence of the probabilities of possible outcomes on actual outcomes (or worse: as a state that determines the probabilities of possible outcomes without input from actual outcomes). It is also why we are baffled by the existence of "EPR correlations" (Einstein et al. 1935 )-correlations between outcomes of measurements performed in spacelike relation that are impervious to both common-cause and mediatory accounts.
What is quantum mechanics sans embroidery? It is a formalism that serves to calculate the probabilities of possible measurement outcomes on the basis of actual outcomes. This "minimal instrumentalist interpretation" (Redhead 1987 ) obviously calls for "some account of the nature of the external world and/or our epistemological relation to it that serves to explain how it is that the statistical regularities predicted by the formalism with the minimal instrumentalist interpretation come out the way they do" (ibid., original emphasis).
One such account is the "Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics" (Mohrhoff 2000 (Mohrhoff , 2001 (Mohrhoff , 2002ab, 2004ab, 2005b (Mohrhoff , 2006b ). According to it, the furniture of the universe consists of (i) property-or value-indicating events lacking sufficient conditions,
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(ii) the properties or values indicated by such events, and (iii) the correlations between possible measurement outcomes encapsulated by the quantum-mechanical probability algorithms. The PIQM attributes the undefinability of the values of unmeasured observables emphasized by Bohr (Jammer 1974 , Petersen 1968 to the nonexistence of such values: to be is to be measured. Macroscopic objects (as defined by the PIQM) are needed to realize properties, thereby making them available for attribution to quantum systems. This calls for (a) rigorous definitions of both "measurement" and "macroscopic", which are provided (Mohrhoff 2004b (Mohrhoff , 2005b (Mohrhoff , 2006a , and (b) the assigning of independent reality to the macroworld.
The question
How can we describe a quantum system S between consecutive measurements of two observables, including observables with non-commuting operators?
Suppose that measurements are repeatable, that the Hamiltonian is zero, and that the outcomes a and b obtained at t a and t b , respectively, can be represented by projectors into one-dimensional subspaces of the system's Hilbert space.
6 Taking our cue from a timehonored sleight-of-hand-the transmogrification of a computational tool into a physical entity in its own right-we might interpret the "retarded" ket |a as representing the physical state of S during the interval [t a , t b ). Or we might-with equal (lack of ) physical justification, given the time-symmetry of the fundamental physical laws-interpret the "advanced" ket |b as representing the physical state of S during the interval (t a , t b ]. Finally we might-in an attempt to do justice to that symmetry-interpret the timesymmetric "two-state" a b introduced by Aharonov and Vaidman (1991) as representing the physical state of S during the interval (t a , t b ).
If we reject these interpretations, we might still posit "retarded" elements of reality corresponding to predictions of probability 1 (Einstein et al. 1935) , or "advanced" elements of reality corresponding to retrodictions of probability 1, or time-symmetric elements of reality corresponding to assignments of probability 1 based on the two-state a b . The first would mean that S has property a during the entire interval [t a , t b ), the 5 The probability of an event indicating a particular value v of a given observable Q is the product of two probabilities: (i) the probability of the occurrence of an event indicating a possible value of Q and (ii) the probability that the indicated value is v given that a value is indicated. According to the PIQM, quantum theory is exclusively concerned with probabilities of the latter kind (Mohrhoff 2002b) . Since in assigning probabilities it implicitly assumes the (actual or counterfactual) occurrence of a valueindicating event, it cannot account for it. The lack of sufficient conditions for such events has also been stressed by Ulfbeck and Bohr (2001) .
second would mean that S has property b during the entire interval (t a , t b ], and the last would imply that S has both properties during the entire interval (t a , t b ).
If we also reject these interpretations, we are left with counterfactual probability assignments, such as:if an observable Q with nondegenerate eigenvectors |q k were measured during the interval (t a , t b ), and if the outcomes at t a is a, then the outcome represented by |q k q k | would be obtained with probability p(q k ) = | q k |a | 2 . Owing to the time-symmetry of the quantum-mechanical correlation laws, the following counterfactual is equally true: if an observable with nondegenerate eigenvectors |q k were measured during the interval (t a , t b ), and if the outcome at t b is b, then the outcome represented by |q k q k | would be obtained with probability p(q k ) = | b|q k | 2 . Both probability assignments make use of Born's rule.
Whereas we may find it "unnatural" to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of an earlier measurement on the basis of the actual outcome of a later measurement, given our time-asymmetric point of view, it is clear that the relative frequencies of outcomes obtained with ensembles that are postselected by the outcome |b b| at t b , tend to the probabilities | b|q k | 2 . Procedurally the two cases are completely analogous. To measure relative frequencies using preselected ensembles, we discard all runs in which the outcome at t a -the so-called "preparation"-differs from |a a|. And to measure relative frequencies using postselected ensembles, we discard all runs in which the outcome at t b differs from |b b|.
The logical next step, which does full justice to the time-symmetry of the fundamental laws, is to measure relative frequencies using pre-and postselected ensembles, discarding all runs in which the outcomes at t a and t b differ from |a a| and |b b|, respectively. The relative frequencies measured in this way approximate probabilities that are calculated by means of the ABL rule (Aharonov et al. 1964) :
In the context of his "Pondicherry interpretation", Mohrhoff (2000 Mohrhoff ( , 2001 Mohrhoff ( , 2004a has argued (i) that the best if not the only way to describe S during an interval (t a , t b ) in which no measurement is performed, is to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of unperformed measurements, and (ii) that in order to be considered objective, these probabilities must be assigned on the basis of all relevant property-indicating events-in this case the measurements at t a and t b -and thus by means of the ABL rule. In a recent paper, Mohrhoff (2006b) , lists the following reasons for considering quantummechanical probabilities as objective: they are based on objective, value-indicating events and objective physical laws, they serve to define and quantify an objective indeterminacy, and they do not involve Bayesian degrees of belief. (According to Mohrhoff, the stability of the hydrogen atom rests on the objective indeterminacies of its internal relative position and momentum, rather than on anyone's subjective uncertainty about the values of these observables.) Probability assignments that fail to take all relevant events into account are tarnished by a subjective element of ignorance. This includes(i) probability assignments to the possible outcomes of an actually performed measurement, inasmuch as these fail to take account of the measurement's actual outcome, and (ii) the "objective" probabilities of the frequentist, inasmuch as these belong to ensembles of actually performed measurements.
The first to use the ABL rule counterfactually were Albert, Aharonov, and D'Amato (1985) . A lively controversy ensued (Cohen 1995; Kastner 1999abc, 2001 Miller 1996; Mohrhoff 2001; Sharp and Shanks 1993; Vaidman 1996ab, 1998ab, 1999abc) . After the jointly published papers by Kastner (2001) and Mohrhoff (2001) , during the preparation of which both authors were aware of each other's repeatedly revised manuscripts, it seemed that the dust had settled, but two years later Kastner (2003) published a fresh critique of the use of time-symmetric counterfactuals by Mohrhoff (2000 Mohrhoff ( , 2001 and by Vaidman 7 (1996ab, 1998ab, 1999abc) . Kastner (2003, 146) maintains that the ABL rule "is essentially a time-symmetric generalization of the von Neumann Projection Postulate", and that therefore it "assumes that the density matrix of the system at the intermediate time t is a proper or 'ignorance'-type mixture". This is not correct. The ABL rule is a time-symmetric generalization of the Born rule, which features in every interpretation of quantum mechanics, whereas the projection postulate, being extraneous to the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and its minimal instrumentalist interpretation, only features in some interpretations. The conclusion that the ABL rule assumes that the density matrix of the system at the intermediate time t is a proper mixture is therefore unfounded. It does however underscore Kastner's bias for von Neumann's (1955) point of view, which is rejected by Mohrhoff. (Since the PIQM does not countenance evolving quantum states, the question of whether quantum states have one or two modes of evolution does not arise in it.) Like Kastner (ibid. 149), we will take the following formulation as the intended meaning of Mohrhoff's TSQCs:
Issues
(1 ′ ) Consider system S having pre-and post-selection outcomes a and b at times t a and t b when a measurement of observable Q was not performed. If a measurement of observable Q had been performed on S at time t, t a < t < t b , and if S had the same pre-and post-selection outcomes as above, then outcome q j would have resulted with probability p ABL (q j |a, b).
As far as the controversy over TSQCs is concerned, this is equivalent to the following possible-worlds formulation:
(2) In the possible world in which observable Q is measured and system S yields outcomes a and b at times t a and t b , respectively, the probability of obtaining result q j at time t is given by p ABL (q j |a, b).
Both statements are undeniably true. What Kastner attempts to demonstrate is that they are "much too weak to support the kinds of claims being advanced by advocates of the TSQC, such as the claim of a nontrivial 'objective probability' by Mohrhoff" (ibid. 150). In fact, Kastner believes that these statements are as vacuous as the following counterfactual:
(A ′ ) If there had been a raffle at time t, and if nobody had entered, then nobody would have won.
Since (A ′ ) is actually self-contradictory, inasmuch as the existence of a winner (or of an entrant, for that matter) is part of the connotation of a raffle, we shall proceed on the assumption that what Kastner has in mind is, (A ′′ ) If an attempt at holding a raffle at time t had been made, and if the attempt had failed because nobody entered, then nobody would have won.
Some TSQCs appear at first blush to make surprising claims, what with Vaidman's (1996b) "three boxes" gedanken experiment or Mohrhoff's (2001) "three holes" variant of the same. The latter warrants the following claims:
(I) Consider a particle launched at a specific location A in front of a plate with three holes.
(Ia) If this particle is detected at a specific location B behind the plate, and if a certain measurement had been made, then one would have found with probability 1 that the particle went through the first hole.
(Ib) If this particle is detected at B, and if a different measurement had been made instead, then one would have found with probability 1 that the particle went through the second hole.
Kastner argues that such counterfactuals, rather than being surprising, are trivial. If you want to ensure the truth of a claim as unlikely as "if an attempt at holding a raffle at time t had been made, then nobody would have won", simply add the equally unlikely antecedent "nobody entered". By the same token, if you want to ensure the truth of the unlikely claim, if a particle launched at a specific location A in front of a plate with three holes had been subjected to a certain measurement, then one would have found with probability 1 that the particle went through the first hole, simply add the unlikely antecedent "the particle is subsequently detected at a specific location B behind the plate". The element of surprise is put in "by hand". According to Kastner, this involves conceptually fixing a certain background condition. In the actual world W a , there are no entrants. Holding this background condition fixed while considering a possible world W p in which an attempt at holding a raffle is made, produces the surprising compound counterfactual (A ′′ ). Holding fixed a background condition that is unlikely to hold in W p , achieves surprise. The result, however, is not a counterfactual that is true for a trivial reason, and hence void of contingent information, as Kastner claims, but a counterfactual providing contingent information-contingent information that is surprising for a trivial reason.
Kastner not only maintains that the counterfactual (1 ′ ) is as vacuous as the counterfactual (A ′′ ) but also claims that it is as invalid. According to her, (C) a counterfactual is valid just in case (i) the antecedent nomologically implies the consequent and
(ii) the background conditions holding in W a (where the antecedent is false) have no dependence on the truth value of the antecedent.
(A ′′ ) obviously fails to satisfy (ii). If an attempt at holding a raffle is made, it is likely to succeed, and if it does, there are entrants. The only way we can force "no winner" to nomologically follow from "an attempt at holding a raffle was made" is to stipulate that the background condition "no entrants" does not change upon introduction of the antecedentdespite the fact that [it] normally would. To do this we add an auxiliary antecedent stipulating the certainty of background condition(s) S which would not normally be certain. In making such a stipulation, we invoke a state of affairs that conflicts with the known processes of our world (such as: when raffles are held, people enter them; and when measurements are made at time t, outcomes at time t b generally don't occur with certainty but only with some probability dependent on the measurement outcome at time t) (Kastner 2003, 152) . What does Kastner mean by "normally"? What does she believe the "known processes of our world" to be? Her thinking appears to be firmly grounded in what Mohrhoff (2005a) has called "the evolutionary paradigm" and branded as "a hangover from classical times". This is the notion that physics can be divided into a kinematical part, which concerns the description of physical systems at an instant of time, and a dynamical part, which concerns the evolution of physical systems from earlier to later times. It induces us to construe the time dependence of a quantum-mechanical probability algorithm as that of an evolving state. The PIQM, by contrast, takes it to be a dependence on the time of the measurement to the possible outcomes of which the algorithm serves to assign probabilities. According to it, the notion of an evolving state is applicable solely to the macroworld, in which the laws of quantum physics (which statistically correlate outcomes or value-indicating events) degenerate into the laws of classical physics (which deterministically correlate events or states of affairs). And it is in the context of this interpretation, and of the challenge to describe a quantum system between measurements in the absence of an evolving state, that the validity of Mohrhoff's TSQC (1 ′ ) ought to be assessed. At the macrolevel we not only have an "evolution" that might as well go in the opposite direction, we also have arrows of time that agree without the experiential "flow" of time, e.g., the thermodynamic and cosmological arrows. Either or both may account for the quantum-mechanical arrow, which consists in the following temporal asymmetry. On the one hand, as explained in note 5, value-indicating events lack sufficient conditions (obtaining at earlier times) and therefore are causal primaries. On the other hand, they create indelible records 8 (existing at later times) and therefore are causal primaries. None of this, however, has any bearing on the description of system S between times t a and t b . For Mohrhoff, echoing Peres, 9 there simply is no such thing as a "known process of our world" where system S and the interval between t a and t b are concerned. If there is anything "normal" about this system and this interval, it is the quantum-mechanical correlation laws, which put us in a position to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of any measurement to which S may be subjected during this interval, on the basis of any (relevant) set of actual outcomes. Kastner is therefore wrong in claiming that (1 ′ ) does "invoke a state of affairs that conflicts with the known processes of our world".
By the same token, Kastner is wrong in claiming that the antecedent (or one of the antecedents) of (1 ′ ) stipulates the certainty of a background condition. If probabilities are assigned on the basis of all relevant earlier outcomes, then a probability can be assigned to the possible outcome b at t b -in W p this depends on the outcome at time t and generally differs from 1-but not to the outcome a at t a since this constitutes the assignment basis. If probabilities are assigned on the basis of all relevant later outcomes, then a probability can be assigned to the possible outcome a at t a -in W p this depends on the outcome at time t and generally differs from 1-but not to the outcome b at t b since this now constitutes the assignment basis. And if probabilities are assigned on the basis of all relevant earlier and later outcomes, then no probability can be assigned to either outcome a at t a or outcome b at t b since both outcomes constitute the basis on which probabilities are assigned (counterfactually, to the possible outcomes of an unperformed measurement). All of these probability assignments result in valid counterfactuals, and none of them implies that the outcome at time t b occurs with certainty (that is, with probability 1), either because the probability of this outcome generally differs from 1 or because this outcome is (or is part of) the basis on which probabilities are assigned.
Kastner's time-asymmetric bias is nevertheless perfectly understandable, not only because it is tempting to think of the probabilities of possible measurement outcomes as being determined by evolving quantum states (rather than by actual measurement outcomes via probability algorithms misleadingly called quantum "states"), but also because the philosophical analysis of counterfactuals is almost exclusively carried out in a framework that takes the "flow" of time for granted. Goodman's (1947 Goodman's ( , 1983 seminal analysis, as noted by Kastner, was plagued by circularity: counterfactuals are defined in terms of cotenability, while cotenability is defined in terms of counterfactuals. The possible-worlds semantics of Lewis (2001) and Stalnaker (1984) , which relies on a notion of closeness or similarity to the actual world, overcomes the circle in the truth-conditional schema of Goodman's metalinguistic approach, but it is plagued by the difficulty of defining and/or measuring similarity between worlds.
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Lewis has the most similar world or worlds agree with the actual world right up to the time t, at which a deviation from the laws of the actual world brings about the antecedent. From then on history again proceeds in accordance with the laws of the actual world. As Döring (1998) remarks, such an analysis precludes any counterfactual extrapolation of what the past would have had to have been in order to bring about the antecedent, even though such "backtracking" is perfectly intelligible (and, we should add, neither vacuous nor invalid nor devoid of interest). It is also inapplicable to the quantum systems to which TSQCs refer, inasmuch as no deviations from the laws governing those systems are required to bring about the antecedent. A different similarity criterion is therefore needed to adequately deal with TSQCs. Fortunately there is exactly one obvious such criterion. According to it, that possible world is closest to the actual world which has all the value-indicating events of the actual world plus one, the measurement at time t.
If one (i) projects the experiential "boundary" between past and future into the physical world and (ii) objectifies our ability to know the past and our inability to know the future, then one is bound to address the similarity question in the context of possible worlds having an open future and a settled past. Like Kastner (2003, 158) , one will consider the measurement outcome at t b as "physically not fixed", and in the spirit of Lewis one will consider that possible world as closest to the actual world which, at the time t, has the same settled past as the actual world and an equally open future. Yet, as has been stressed in Sec. 2, in the physical world there is no such thing as a settled past or an open future. Nothing is "physically fixed" if this means determined by an evolving quantum state. If anything is "physically fixed", it is outcomes having probability 1 assigned to them, but this fixing depends not only on the quantum-mechanical correlation laws but also on a choice of assignment basis. And if the fixing is to be considered objective or physical, all relevant events will have to be taken into account, the later ones as well as the earlier ones, both of which, instead of being fixed, contribute to the fixing.
Kastner's cotenability condition (C) is equally discretionary. Outcome a is not the only permissible fixed background condition. As we have seen, outcome b is another legitimate choice, and so are the two outcomes taken together.
As Kastner (ibid. 154) admits, the persuasiveness of her argument against the counterfactual use of the ABL rule by Mohrhoff and by Vaidman depends on the strength of the analogy between (A ′′ ) and (1 ′ ). Mohrhoff (2001) has pointed out a disanalogy between quantum and "classical" counterfactuals, in response to which Kastner (ibid. 155) considers a "quantum raffle", which she claims to be "isomorphic, in every relevant sense, to the situation considered in a TSQC". It goes like this, more or less:
• At time t a , there are N > 0 possible "entrants" and an equal number of quantum systems ("quantum coins"). Although it is not clear whether Kastner wants us to think of the entrants as classical or as quantum systems, the fact that each of them "could be some sort of device rather than a person" suggests a classical nature.
• If no raffle is held at time t, each "coin remains in an unflipped ready state". Since only a measurement apparatus-treated classically-has a "ready state", we take it that each "quantum coin" comes equipped with a measurement device.
• "If a raffle is held at time t, a signal is sent to each of the N prospective entrants which triggers a coin flip." While the signal is clearly of a classical nature, we are left to guess that not only the raffle is held at time t but also the signal is sent at time t and the coin flip both is triggered at time t and does happen at time t.
Neither the relationship between possible entrants and coin flips nor the meaning of "triggering" the "flip" of a quantum coin is elucidated, nor are we told what "holding a raffle" means in this context. But since the usual outcome of a coin flip is either heads or tails, and since the coin itself is quantum in nature, we appear to be invited to imagine a two-state quantum system "in" a superposition 11 of heads and tails subjected at time t to a measurement with these two possible outcomes, 11 The scare quotes remind us that in the context of the PIQM a superposition is not a physical state but a mathematical feature of a probability algorithm.
which is triggered by a classical signal if a certain condition referred to as "holding a raffle" is satisfied.
• "For each coin flip that comes up heads," a possible entrant becomes an actual entrant. We are not told when this transformation takes place. At time t itself?
• "At time t b , the number of entrants M is recorded." Since the scenario as described by Kastner so far suggests that each quantum coin comes equipped with a measurement device, and that the latter is put into operation at time t if a raffle is held, we seem to be entitled to conclude that if a raffle is held, then a record of the outcome-heads or tails-is created at time t (recall note 8), and hence that the measurement of the value of M performed at time t b is a classical measurement: instead of creating its outcome, it merely reveals a state of affairs already in existence.
Yet apparently this is not what Kastner has in mind, for subsequently she treats each "quantum coin" as a three-state quantum system and tells us that there is no fact of the matter as to possessed properties of the quantum coins (ready, heads or tails), since they are not being measured (according to Mohrhoff's ontology) . Only at time t b do we measure the coins and find out how many (M) are in heads states (ibid.).
" [W] e measure the coins" means that we subject each coin to a measurement with three possible outcomes. Suppose that we find only tails. Then there are no actual entrants and therefore no raffle was held. But if no raffle was held, the coins were not flipped, and so there are no tails. Hence unless Kastner's "quantum raffle" is logically inconsistent, it precludes a possible outcome-the finding of only tails. It effectively stipulates that the background condition "not only tails" does not change upon introduction of the antecedent, despite the fact that it very well could. Kastner arrives at the conclusion that the quantum raffle violates a cotenability requirement via a different route, but that is immaterial. What matters is that her analogy fails. Nothing in her scenario involves quantum mechanics in an essential way. To the extent that it is consistent, it can be mimicked by a completely classical setup. The superposition of heads and tails, being of no consequence whatsoever, can be replaced by a classical coin flipping machine.
12 What is more, the fact that no noncommuting observables are involved would seem to guarantee, by Kastner's own standards (ibid. note 1), the uncontroversial validity of the counterfactual in question: "It should be noted that the case in which the counterfactual measurement is one which commutes with either the pre-or post-selection observable is a special one in which the corresponding TSQC fulfills a consistent history condition and can therefore be seen as uncontroversially valid." Eventually, Kastner (ibid. 156 ) gets around to explaining that "a raffle taking place at t corresponds to a unitary evolution of the ready state to a state which is an equal superposition of the heads and tails states", and proceeds to argue that even though "the raffle differs from the usual TSQT [sic] in that there is a unitary evolution between t and t b if the raffle is held", (a) "the difference in no way disqualifies the example as a fair analogy" inasmuch as (b) "such an evolution is fully time symmetric". Neither does this difference capture what essentially distinguishes the raffle from the "usual" TSQC, namely the raffle's equivalence to a classical scenario just pointed out, nor does Kastner indicate how (b) follows from (a). As far as the PIQM is concerned, "unitary evolution" stands for the dependence of probabilities on the time of the measurement to the possible outcomes of which they are assigned. While this "evolution" is time-symmetric in that probabilities can be assigned on the basis of earlier and/or later actual outcomes, it lacks the time-symmetry of a deterministically evolving classical state, which allows us to retrodict state A given state B if and only if B is predictable given A. The quantum state "prepared" by the measurement at t a and "evolving" toward later times generally differs from the quantum state "retropared" by the measurement at t b and "evolving" toward earlier times.
Kastner attributes to both Mohrhoff and Vaidman the claim that "certain 'behindthe-scenes' features of quantum systems (i.e., questions of how it happens that a system ends up with one outcome or another at times t a or t b )" (ibid., original emphasis) immunize TSQCs against comparisons with everyday counterfactuals. As far as Mohrhoff is concerned, this attribution is peculiar, since he has insisted from the start that there are no answers to such questions:
[N]othing ever causes a measurement to take place. Measurements. . . are causal primaries. Quantum physics is concerned with correlations between events or states of affairs that are uncaused and therefore fundamentally inexplicable (Mohrhoff 2000, 736) .
[T]he actual events or states of affairs that indicate the possession of a contingent property (by a system) or of a value (by an observable) are causal primaries, and this not in the sense that nothing ever causes a measurement to yield this particular value rather than that, but in the sense that nothing ever causes a measurement to be successful or to take place (Mohrhoff 2001, 867) .
While a classical counterfactual assumes that something obtains whereas in reality something else obtains, a quantum counterfactual assumes that some-thing obtains where in reality nothing obtains (ibid. note 23, original emphases), Kastner (2003, 157) believes that "by this definition, Mohrhoff's own 'subjective' counterfactual usage of the ABL rule would constitute a 'classical counterfactual' which would therefore be disqualified from comparison with his TSQC". In support of this conclusion she offers another quotation:
In principle, both rules [Born and ABL] have an objective as well as a subjective application. If Q is actually measured, both rules assign probabilities that are subjective inasmuch as they are based on probability measures that fail to take account of at least one relevant fact-the result of the measurement of Q (ibid. 865).
Whereas the first quotation points out a difference between classical and quantum counterfactuals, the second points out the reason why probability assignments to the possible outcomes of an actually performed measurement are subjective. A counterfactual assignment of an ABL probability can be subjective, but not for this reason. If it is subjective, then it is so because the assignment basis fails to include all relevant value-indicating events. Thus, contrary to what is asserted by Kastner, a "subjective counterfactual usage of the ABL rule" does not constitute a classical counterfactual. The use of the ABL rule to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of an actually performed measurement is not a subjective counterfactual usage, and a subjective counterfactual use of the ABL rule (being subjective only because of an incomplete assignment basis) does not result in a classical counterfactual. It still refers to a situation in which "nothing obtains". Kastner (2003, 158) observes that "Mohrhoff's tenseless view of facts-i.e., that a statement such as "X is true at time t b " should be seen as holding at all other times-fails to accomplish the kind of counterfactual fixing he seeks." As far as we can tell, Mohrhoff seeks no counterfactual fixing. He seeks a way to describe quantum systems between measurements, and he finds that if there is one, it consists in assigning probabilities (i) counterfactually and (ii) on the basis of all relevant outcomes. Where (1 ′ ) is concerned, this means on the basis of the outcomes obtained at t a and t b .
"[I]f we are going to consider a counterfactual event at t", so Kastner's argument continues, "then, to be consistent with physical law, we also have to consider possible outcomes at either t a or t b other than the actual ones, that might have occurred but didn't." Considering outcomes that might have occurred in place of outcomes that did occur, contributes nothing to the question of how we should describe system S between the measurements yielding a and b at t a and t b , respectively. Such outcomes are irrelevant to the question addressed by Mohrhoff. We fail to see why not considering what is irrelevant to the question at hand should be inconsistent with physical law.
Conclusion
We have examined Kastner's (2003) renewed attempts to invalidate Mohrhoff's counterfactual use of the ABL rule and are forced to conclude that these attempts are unfounded and/or ill-conceived and/or beside the point. Mohrhoff's TSQCs are designed neither to give us surprising probabilities (ibid. 159) nor to "serve the purpose of circumventing noncotenability" (ibid. 153) nor "to support. . . the claim of a nontrivial 'objective probability' " (ibid. 150). They do not merely "restate the ABL rule" (ibid. 159) but use this rule for the purpose of describing quantum systems between measurements. Whereas Kastner claims that (1 ′ ) is true for a trivial reason, and hence vacuous, we found that all that can justifiably be asserted is that some of its consequences are surprising for a trivial reason.
